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Introduction 
  The sixteenth century was an notable era for its effervescence on the religious, political and 
military stage. Geopolitics map of that time reveal the powers, the opposition and the minority: 
Habsburg’s hegemony, emulation of France to rule in Europe, the threat of Ottoman Imperialism 
and the Protestants efforts to survive. Ottoman policy intended to maintain political disunity in 
Europe in order to weaken the Habsburgs and prevent a crusade that could coalesce disparate 
forces of Europe. Ottoman intervention was thus not only a decisive factor in the rise of national 
monarchies, as in France, but also in the rise of Protestantism in Europe. 
   The paper will research to what measure did the Ottoman Empire influence the genesis of the 
Protestant movement in Europe. The question - ,,whom did the Turks support more: the 
Protestants or the Catholics? was for a long time a realm of debates for theologians and even for 
historians.  
From providence to geopolitics 
  Luther was against overturning an arbitrary and repressive government through revolution, 
because the time or external enemies will turn the situation.  However, Protestants have 1
negotiated extremely carefully any military support that Catholics had asked them to fight 
against Ottomans or its allies. One of their favorite slogans was: ‘‘No help without even a 
concession’’.  The same happened when Ferdinand, the king of the Romans in Hungary, asked 2
for help against his rival usurper Zápolya, which had struck a deal with the Turks. Their refusal 
was due to their desire that the king to cancel unfavorable decisions of the Diet of Speyer in 
1529.   3
   The Protestants were the main beneficiaries of the conflict between Charles and Ferdinand on 
the one hand and on the other hand the Ottomans. ‘‘It wouldn’t have been Turks the Reformation 
would have had most likely the fate of Albigensian’s uprising’’.  What prevented Carol in 1526 4
to settle by force the religious problem and to dissolve the Diet of Speyer was the pressure 
exerted by the Ottomans on Hungary and Central Europe, and the need to be able to resist using 
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German Protestants.  For this reason, Charles was forced to sign with the Protestant princes, in 5
1532, the Peace of Nuremberg,  to accept the Treaty of Passau and, finally, to sign, in 1555, the 6
Peace of Augsburg, due to which was recognized formally the Protestantism in Germany. 
    Andre Clot summarizes very well this causality:  
‘‘Due to the Turkish threat, the Habsburgs were embarrassed, if not paralyzed in their fight 
against the Reformation. Charles and Ferdinand could not devote all the forces fighting 
against the heathen, being constantly forced to fight the Protestants. Because he could not 
simultaneously pursue two goals - the return of Protestants to the Church and to drive the 
Turks out of Europe - they dropped the crusade against the Ottomans. The Ottomans knew 
that too well  when they encouraged Protestantism everywhere. Forcing the Habsburg to 
divide their forces, the Turks and the Protestants of the sixteenth century were probably 
saving one another.’’  7
   The religious problem of Germany , as it was called in the chronicles, was to see if Charles V 8
was more serious than the Ottoman enemy. Charles V was aware of the expansion of Islam in the 
Mediterranean while Protestantism was expanding in Europe. At the same time France was 
challenging the supremacy of the Holy Roman Empire. His political implications were 
determined by the confrontations with Soliman and Luther.  On the one side, the Protestant 9
leaders, who hated the Turks as much as the king, took advantage of every opportunity provided 
by the continuing battle between the Turks and the Habsburgs; but they had hardly ever given the 
aid requested by Charles and Ferdinand. On the other side, officially, they never accepted the 
alliance that Suleyman proposed to them in several occasions, especially in a letter sent in 1522 
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to the Protestant princes.  Later, the Sultan offered his help to the Lutheran princes from the 10
Netherlands. Melanchthon and the Orthodox Patriarch of Istanbul were friends, the Patriarch 
serving him as an intermediary in relations with the Gate.  
   Daniel Goffman, one of the most famous American turcologist, claims that the major factor for 
the expansion of Lutheranism in Europe was the Ottoman’s menace, which directly encouraged 
Protestantism, as in northern Hungary and Transylvania, where Calvinism (‘‘Calvino-Turkism’’) 
became the dominant religion. Supporting and protecting the Lutherans and the Calvinists 
against the Catholicism was meant to be the cornerstone of Turkish policy in Europe.  11
   In the second half of the sixteenth century the French Calvinist faction argued that the alliance 
with the Ottomans  must be used against the Catholic Spain, and the massacre of the Calvinists 12
in St. Bartholomew (August 1572) angered the Ottoman government.  13
   In the paper ‘‘Ottoman influence on the Protestant Reformation in Hungary’’ Alexander Sandor 
Unghvary contradicts at least partially, with local examples, the claim that the Ottomans have 
preferred schismatics, arguing that Ottomans did not support any Protestants, nor Catholics. 
After the victory of Mohacs, the Sultan asked the Hungarian nobility to assemble the Diet to 
work out a modus vivendi in the conquered territory. Most of the Hungarians regarded the 
Turkish as the natural enemies of the nation. In general the Roman Catholic clergy in Hungary 
was regarded by the Ottomans as the natural agent of the Habsburg dynasty.  But when the 14
Ottoman administrators realized that neither side was willing to make alliance with them, they 
tried to pursue only their own interests. Whenever there were disputes between the Hungarian 
Catholics and Protestants, the Cadi or the Mufti who was in charge was very careful to favor 
 Although formally the Ottoman Empire has not concluded any alliance with the Protestants, the Turks have 10
always regarded the League of Schmalkalden as a natural ally because they struggle against the hegemonic trend of 
Charles V, who was regarded as a successor of Charlemagne, a Rex Romanorum who - like David, will gather the 
sheep into one fold. Suleyman the Magnificent transmitted in a letter to Protestant princes that they will not be the 
target of Ottoman soldiers when they will pass through Germany. In another letter sent from Ottoman Empire, the 
Calvinists were commended for their courage with which they fought against the Catholics under the command of 
the Prince of Conde: ‘‘If these white men were under my command, I would have conquered the whole world with 
them and nobody would have could stop me.’’
 Daniel Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 11
2004), 111; Inalcik, Imperiul Otoman, Epoca clasica: 1300-1600, 84-85
 If in the first decades of the sixteenth century the Ottoman threat was justly labeled Terror Europae, in the second 12
part of the century, the Ottoman invasion was no longer an imminent danger.
 Suleyman assured that, if Eastern armies will penetrate the Western Europe, he intended to grant amnesty to 13
Lutheran princes. One French envoy sent in Istanbul reported to his superiors that several times the imams prayed, 
in the mosques of Istanbul, for the enemity and disunity of all Christians in Europe. The Turks felt sympathy to the 
Protestants because they were condemning the veneration of icons and were against the Pope.
 Alexander Sandor Unghvary, The Hungary Protestant Reformation in the Sixteenth Century Under the Ottoman 14
Impact (Queenston: The Edwin Mellen Press,1989), 117.
those who was paid more and usually those who formed the majority in that area. The motivation 
was very simple: what mattered most was the financial interest of the Gate and the stability in 
that area. In Szeged, the demands for a church building, coveted by both Lutheran Congregation 
and the increasing number of Calvinist Protestants, and the dispute about who should pay the 
pastor, led to a rather draconian decision of an wise Aga: ‘‘Preachers, if you wish to keep your 
infidel heads on your shoulders, make peace among yourselves. If not, your head will roll in the 
mud like pumpkins.’’  Due to ill and inhuman treatment the Hungarian rayas were subjected to, 15
the author questions the concept of Pax Ottoman, preferring instead, for a better understanding 
of the cruel reality, the syntagma Holocaustum Ottomanicum. 
Mutual strategic interests 
   According to the Romanian historian Stephen Fischer-Galati not only Protestant reformers 
tried to benefit from the association with the Turks and the Ottoman threat amplification. Often 
the Habsburgs used the same political stratagem of exaggerating the Ottoman danger. Emperor 
Maximilian exaggerated the Ottoman danger to convoke the Diet.  Many Catholics no longer 16
took seriously the desperate calls to crusade because the Pope repeatedly collected large sums of 
money. The Protestants and the Catholics accused each other of secret agreements with the Turks 
and by pointing out that they had a more common background with Islam than with Christianity. 
The pamphlet ‘‘Papismo-Turkism’’ published  in 1599 was an attack and a response of Jesuit 
William Renolds to the ‘‘agreement’’ of the Church of England with the Ottoman Empire, the so-
called ‘‘Calvino-Turkism’’.   17
   Machiavelli must have understood that difficult times were ahead and he was looking to a great 
Ottoman victory which would have saved Italian liberty. He even welcomed the news of the 
crushing defeat in Hungary in 1526 and he foresaw the siege of Vienna. He hoped that the 
Habsburgs would not be able to resist the pressure of the Turkish forces, especially as they were 
not helped by the revolts of the Lutherans in Germany and the rebellion of the Moors in Spain.  18
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  This was in fact a scheme which would be revived from time to time during the following 
century: concurring with the Turks seemed a solution for everyone who fought to counter the 
political system of the Counter-Reformation first in Netherlands, then in Bohemia. It was not 
only the Anglican Robert Cecil, Huguenots, but their friend, the Catholic Paolo Sarpi, who rested 
their hopes on the Turks’ incursions.  Paolo Sarpi endeavored ceaselessly to free Venice from 19
the political and religious’ yoke of Rome. He wrote to his Huguenot friend Groslot, whose father 
was killed in the massacre of St. Bartholomew:  ‘‘Sancta Turkey, libera nos!’’   20
   More still, France tried to create an anti-Habsburg alliance with the Turks. This agreement was 
not as solid as they would have liked, yet, through it, they managed to limit the force of the 
Habsburg imperialism, generating what is called ‘‘the geopolitical balance of power’’- which 
helped the Reformation survive.  The sultan, who knew this idea, saw in the alliance with 21
France an effective tool against the hegemony of the Habsburg dynasty.  Suleyman renewed 22
from time to time the hostilities against the king of the Romans in order to discourage the 
compromise that could happen between the two rival European powers: France and the Western 
Roman Empire, which could unite them against the common enemy - the Ottoman Empire. In 
this context the Protestants have always moved and won.  23
Visions of the Ottoman world in reformers’ writings. Paradoxes in the interpretation of 
Martin Luther 
  In this context of anti-Habsburg policy, Erasmus’ humanists gained influence throughout 
Europe. The supporters of irenicism and of non-doctrinal religion: Rabelais, Montaigne, Vives, 
Sarpi and Laguna, gained followers in France, Spain and Italy. These thinkers, headed by 
Melanchthon regarded the sultan as the heir of Byzantium.  Luther became the exponent of a 24
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considerable part of the German population who wanted Ottomans to lead them because German 
people was wild and uncivilized - ‘‘half men and half devils’’.  Reformers interpretations 25
paradox is that although the Turks were enemies of the Christians, there was a greater enemy to 
be feared, a foe who was the head of the Christian Church - the papacy. Actually, the Ottoman 
Empire, through its incursions, tempered the papacy’s aggressiveness.  Luther’s warnings about 26
Ottomans menace sprang from a background of apocalyptic fear as expressed in German popular 
hymnology.  The Turks were the instruments of God’s wrath. The secret of their success was 27
unmistakably - God fight against a vicious and corrupt Christendom. From this point of view the 
understanding of that time - ‘‘Let the Turks be Turks’’ convey more tolerance than accepting 
God's whip.  For millenarians like Muntzer and the early Anabaptist preachers, the whole world 28
was soon to be conquered by the Turks, preparing the way for the abominable reign of the 
Antichrist.  Luther's perspective revealed in his study ‘‘Tischreden’’  was a little bit different: 29
‘’Just as the Pope is the Antichrist, so the Turk is the Devil incarnate’’.  Since 1522, Luther had 30
criticized the Pope’s Bull Coena Domini, where Leo X repeated the old interdiction against 
supplying weapons of war to the Turks: ‘’What evil does the Turk do? He occupies his provinces 
and governs them reasonably’’.  The same disapproval of the anti-Ottoman war can be found in 31
that famous text, An den Christlichen Adel Deutcher Nation, where Luther stated: ‘’If we want to 
fight against the Turks, let us begin here where they are worst of all’’. Luther's rhetoric continues 
in Von den guten Wercken: ‘’Christendom is being destroyed not by the Turks, but by those who 
are supposed to defend it. Roman Curia is more tyrannical than any Turkish’’.  His attitude 32
changed with time, there being notable differences between his first approaching and what he 
wrote after the siege of Vienna, or again, later, during his final years. After the Turks abandon 
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Vienna, because the Turks were at the gate (Turcas ante port) he writes the brochure ‘‘Sermons 
against the Turks’’. Inspired by the Ottoman threat and invasion beyond the gates of Vienna, 
Luther  composed a very known christian hymn Unser Gott Ein feste Burg called later by 
German poet Heinrich Heine  the ‘’Marseillaise of Reformation’’.     33
   Ottoman invasion of Hungary and Austria in the 1529 campaign, when the German population 
was cruelly attacked, prompted Luther to change the paradigm. In these troubled times he 
summons people to organize resistance. In two of his works ‘‘Von Kriege Turcken wieder die’’ 
and ‘‘Eine Heerpredigtwidder Turcken den’’, Luther points out that no defense of Christianity is 
possible without fighting on both fronts: against Turks and Papacy. At this time, the imminence 
of an anti-Ottoman war corresponds with mobilization and coalition of forces which God 
approves: victims of Ottoman attacks have revenge.  Another reason that led him to change his 34
perspective on the Ottoman danger was represented by the so-called negotiations between pope, 
France and the Western Roman Empire, in order to sign an alliance with the sultan. This 
imminent danger grew from day to day, changing the optics of Luther: ‘’The Turks drive the 
people to the market, buy and sell them, and use them as animals, be they man or woman, young 
or old, married or unmarried - so evil is the Turkish nature’’.  Calvin qualify,, papacy as the 35
little horn 'of Daniel's prophecy. Pagan and Papal Roman Empire together with the Eastern 
Roman Empire and Islam, represent the two horns of Antichrist and the fourth beast of Daniel 7. 
In the Institutes of the Christian Religion, Calvin read Daniel 7:25 referencing the Pope: 
‘‘Roman Pontiff is Antichrist, whereof Paul says that sits in the temple of God (2 Tes.2: 4).’’  36
French reformer was convinced that Christ's kingdom will triumph over both the papacy and the 
Turks, both being religions that were human inventions. There were also other European writers 
who have written books to help Christians overcome fear of Turks. Scholars have launched 
writings on how it can be destroyed Ottoman Empire.  
   Unlike Luther, Erasmus approached the subject from a more optimistic outlook: ‘‘the size of 
Ottoman Empire should not scare people. The Roman Empire and that of Alexander the Great 
were very large and thought to be invincible. But today, they no longer exist.’’ Erasmus, one of 
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the most famous philosophers of Europe, which has had great success with his book Praise of 
madness, wrote in Ultissima Consultatio de Bello Turcis Inferendo (1530) the following words 
about the Turks ‘‘they are barbarians with dark origins that conquered part of Europe due to 
differences of opinion between Christians and that the time has come for brothers of the same 
religion to be rescued from captivity.’’  Erasmus did not agree with the war, but believed that 37
elimination of the Ottomans means survival of Christians. 
Conclusions 
   Beyond religious reasons, one of the real reasons that Luther changed optics regarding the 
Ottoman menace, was the nearness of the Turkish invincible armada at the gates of Vienna. 
From a circumstantial outlook, Luther regarded the Turks as allies against the papacy. Luther's 
main concern was theological, not political, so he regarded the Turks as ,, the rod of God's wrath 
against the Europe’s sins.’’  38
  The tradition of princes and many cities to oppose to the imperial authority, the economic and 
religious call of Lutherans, the opposition of Germans to Roman policies, the refusing of Pope to 
summon a council, and perhaps the most significant - the Ottoman threat - all created favorable 
conditions for Protestantism survival. 
 Protestants have taken advantage of this instability provided by Turkish attacks and 
strengthened their power in Germany. They exploited the need of Habsburgs for military 
assistance against the Turks. Almost all the concessions made by the Habsburgs before 1526 
were directly influenced by the Ottoman danger. It seems paradoxical that the Reform 
strengthened because the Turks diverted the attention of the Habsburgs from the  religion dispute 
in Germany, making the latter dependent on cooperation with Lutherans in order to achieve their 
ambitions secular Europe. 
 Consolidation, expansion and legitimacy of Lutheranism should be assigned to Ottoman 
imperialism more than any other factor. We have to remember that every principal actor on this 
stage of effervescent century has played his role, be it about the Habsburg Empire, the Ottoman 
power or the Protestant Reformation. Turks favored Protestants insofar as they served their 
interests in Europe, while the latter took full advantage of the Ottoman incursions to consolidate 
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their power. Both sides wanted to diminish the power of the Habsburg, consequently of the 
Catholic Church. 
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